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EMBODIED COGNITION, LAW, AND JUSTICE

ADAM BENFORADO*
ABSTRACT
Recent research from embodied cognition strongly contests the dualist
notion of the mind as distinct and apart from the biological machine of the
body—a conception that has powerfully shaped our laws, legal practices,
theories, and institutions for centuries. According to the embodied (or
grounded) cognition perspective, the body is involved in the constitution of the
mind. Thus, beyond our conscious awareness, an abstract concept, like
trustworthiness, may be primed by sensorimotor experience, like feeling
physical warmth. This Article introduces recent insights from this budding
field, discusses some of the potential implications of experiments in embodied
cognition for courtroom interactions, and addresses the significant challenges
to using this research as a means to reform.
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[T]he principal error and the commonest . . . consists in my judging that the
ideas which are in me are similar or conformable to the things which are
outside me . . . .

– René Descartes1
Although . . . I possess a body with which I am very intimately conjoined, . . . it
is certain that this I [that is to say, my soul by which I am what I am], is
entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it.

– René Descartes2
INTRODUCTION
A.

The Legacy of Dualism

There is the body. There is the mind. They are separate and distinct. This
is the language of the law and the core of our culture. This is the discourse of
Western existence. Mens rea and actus reus; mind over matter; body and soul.
The conception of the body and the mind as dissimilar, interacting entities
can be traced back at least as far as Plato and the ancient Greeks, but it is the
seventeenth-century French rationalist René Descartes who is most often
associated with the idea of dualism.3 For Descartes, humans were made up “of
two distinct substances—res cogitans, unextended thinking substance, or mind,

1. RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS 82 (Elizabeth S.
Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., DOVER PUBS. 2003).
2. Id. at 112.
3. Marleen Rozemond, The Nature of the Mind, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
DESCARTES’ MEDITATIONS 48, 48 (Stephen Gaukroger ed., 2006) (“[L]ong before Descartes, a
central component of the Christian tradition had been the idea that the human soul is immortal
and this idea was often (although not always) supported by arguments to the effect that it is
incorporeal.”). Certain scholars have challenged the notion that Descartes actually held beliefs
commonly understood as Cartesian dualism, while nevertheless acknowledging the influence and
pervasiveness of this formulation. See, e.g., GORDON BAKER & KATHERINE J. MORRIS,
DESCARTES’ DUALISM 1 (1996). Other scholars have suggested that humans are born Cartesian
dualists. As Paul Bloom writes,
We can explain much of what makes us human by recognizing that we are natural
Cartesians—dualistic thinking comes naturally to us. We have two distinct ways of
seeing the world: as containing bodies and as containing souls. These two modes of
seeing the world interact in surprising ways in the course of the development of each
child, and in the social context of a community of humans they give rise to certain
uniquely human traits, such as morality and religion.
PAUL BLOOM, DESCARTES’ BABY: HOW THE SCIENCE OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT EXPLAINS
WHAT MAKES US HUMAN, at xii (2004); id. at xiii (“[B]efore they can speak or walk or control
their bowels, babies see the world as containing both physical things, which are governed by
principles such as solidity and gravity, and immaterial minds, which are driven by emotions and
goals. Babies are natural-born dualists.”).
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and res extensa, extended corporeal substance, or body.”4 Thus, senseperception was not a necessary component of the fully conceived mind: a mind
needed only to have intellectual capacities “and the ability to perform the kind
of willing involved in judgment.”5
Although varying somewhat in form and articulation over the centuries,
this dualist notion of the mind as independent and apart from the biological
machine of the body has had an incredible influence on our beliefs, practices,
customs, and institutions.6 Indeed, it has been offered as an explanation for not
only libertarian tendencies and religious convictions concerning a divine
creator, but also for our appreciation of art and even certain types of humor.7
In line with broader societal trends, our laws and legal theories have not
been immune to the power of the dualist conception.8 The moral intuitions
about responsibility and free will underlying (and justifying) our legal
frameworks are based on an understanding of the mind as an independent

4. JOHN COTTINGHAM, DESCARTES 119 (1986) [hereinafter COTTINGHAM, DESCARTES];
see also John Cottingham, The Mind-Body Relation, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO DESCARTES’
MEDITATIONS, supra note 3, at 179, 184-85 (discussing the two kinds of substance and positing
that there may be a third); TOM SORRELL, DESCARTES: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 78 (Very
Short Introduction ed., 2000).
5. SORRELL, supra note 4, at 77; see also COTTINGHAM, DESCARTES, supra note 4, at 119
(“Descartes’ claim that an act of thinking or doubting ‘needs no place and depends on no material
thing’ (e.g., requires no brain) . . . .”). As scholars have argued,
A . . . notorious problem for dualism is the problem of interaction between mind and
body. . . . [Descartes] explicitly remarks that we know from our experience that mind acts
upon, and is acted upon by, body. But since mind and body are defined by Descartes in
terms of not just distinct but mutually incompatible attributes, it is not easy to see how
such causal flow is possible.
Id. (citation omitted). Based on its singularity and placement, Descartes determined that the place
of linkage—the “principal seat” of the “soul”—must be a specific area of the brain, the pineal
gland. 1 RENÉ DESCARTES, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 340–41 (John
Cottingham et al. trans., 1985).
6. Lisa Feldman Barrett & Kristen A. Lindquist, The Embodiment of Emotion, in
EMBODIED GROUNDING: SOCIAL, COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC APPROACHES
237, 238 (Gün R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith eds., 2008) (noting that “dualistic thinking . . . remains
firmly entrenched in our everyday reasoning about the world”).
7. See BLOOM, supra note 3, at xiii; Joshua Green & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law,
Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B:
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1779 (2004) (noting that many religious individuals are “explicitly
dualist libertarians”).
8. At the most basic level, many areas of law distinguish between the mental world and the
physical world. As Laura Spitz has observed, “Family law courts have historically punished
physical abuse to a greater degree than mental abuse. First Amendment jurisprudence regularly
engages in deciding whether and in what circumstances actions are speech. Tort remedies often
require determinations of fact about whether injuries are physical or nonphysical.” Laura Spitz, I
Think, Therefore I Am; I Feel, Therefore I Am Taxed: Déscartes, Tort Reform, and the Civil
Rights Tax Relief Act, 35 N.M. L. REV. 429, 436 n.47 (2005).
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“uncaused causer” animating the material body and allowing it “to move
without any apparent physical cause and in pursuit of goals.”9 Moral
blameworthiness turns on the existence of a mind: “[W]hen something is seen
as a mere physical entity operating in accordance with deterministic physical
laws, it ceases to be seen, intuitively, as a mind. Consequently, it is seen as an
object unworthy of moral praise or blame.”10 Was the criminal defendant
compelled beyond his awareness or control? Or was his act the result of “a
guilty mind”—that rational, separate entity that masters the body? Our
retributivist legal principles—referenced in everything from the grading of
homicides to various criminal defenses—derive their authority from the
assumed existence of this “free will.”11 And the same can be said of tort law:
the objective reasonable person standard is built on the assumption that
humans possess “will power” through which the rational, autonomous brain
can control our actions in the material world.12
The Enlightenment view of free will—reliant on Cartesian dualism—“is
[also] a key component of the ‘liberal self’ in First Amendment theory.”13
Thought and action are separate: in the words of Ronald Dworkin,
“Government insults its citizens, and denies their moral responsibility, when it
decrees that they cannot be trusted to hear opinions that might persuade them
to dangerous or offensive convictions.”14 The independent, autonomous mind
filters information; it thinks and chooses; it decides what the body should do.
Thus, “the incitement standard derived from the landmark Supreme Court case
of Brandenburg v. Ohio seems to assume that, except in extreme
circumstances, human beings can resist harmful messages through reflection
and rational thought.”15
That the legal sphere should be marked by the brand of dualism is perhaps
expected; more surprising is that the Cartesian divide has made a lasting
impression on even those fields, like psychology, which purport to take up the
study of mental functions and behavior directly. As Lisa Feldman Barrett and
Kristen A. Lindquist explain,

9. Green & Cohen, supra note 7, at 1782.
10. Id.
11. See john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond
Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035, 1040 (2010); see also Jon Hanson &
David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal,
93 GEO. L.J. 1, 18–20 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character]
(discussing state of mind elements of criminal law).
12. Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 11, at 15–18.
13. Matthew D. Bunker & David K. Perry, Standing at the Crossroads: Social Science,
Human Agency and Free Speech Law, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2004).
14. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 200 (1996).
15. Bunker & Perry, supra note 13, at 4 (footnote omitted).
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[Dualism’s] residue is highly conserved in psychological theories of mind in
the form of the machine metaphor: the idea that any psychological
phenomenon can be understood to function like a machine, with processes that
can be separated into definable bits and pieces that have no necessary causal
16
relation to one another but that can interact.

Hence, even where it ought to be most exposed as a myth—where the best
tools lie for chipping away the accretion of many hundreds of years—the
notion of the mind and body as independent, distinct, and possessing unique,
individual structures, properties, and processes has persisted.17
In many ways, a truly robust challenge has only come in the last decade or
so, as researchers have begun directly testing the dualist conception through
experimentation.18 This recent research in embodied cognition by cognitive
psychologists, social psychologists, and neuroscientists, among others, casts
strong doubt on the traditional understanding of the mind and body as placed
“in opposition, as well as more recent scientific understanding of thought as
abstract, disembodied information processing.”19 In particular, that research
suggests “the body helps to constitute the mind” and that the Cartesian
boundaries between the mind and the body must be dissolved.20 Our
perceptions, attitudes, feelings, memories, and judgments are influenced—
indeed, constructed—by bodily states and experiences. Abstract thought is
actually grounded to a significant extent in our bodies’ interactions with the
concrete, physical world.
This has significant implications for law, but this work has not been
considered by the legal establishment and is nearly absent from existing law
review literature. One of the purposes of this Article is to encourage legal
scholars, judges, and others to engage research on embodied cognition and
explore potential issues that the work raises for our laws and legal theories.
B.

Learning from the Mind Sciences

The subsequent discussion is intended not only to show the potential
impact of a vital, emerging area of research for our jurisprudence, but also to
illuminate some of the challenges of continuing to incorporate mind sciences
research into law and legal theory. Over the centuries, an Enlightenment
16. Barrett & Lindquist, supra note 6, at 238.
17. Id.
18. Lawrence W. Barsalou, Grounded Cognition, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 617, 619–20
(2008). Of course, Cartesian dualism has been assailed in different ways over the centuries and
there have been important challenges to its foundations beyond those discussed in this Article
even within the narrow field of psychology. Id. The focus here is on what is arguably the most
potent and sophisticated attack to date: research in embodied cognition.
19. EMBODIED GROUNDING: SOCIAL, COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC
APPROACHES, supra note 6, at i.
20. Barrett & Lindquist, supra note 6, at 246.
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conception of the human being—of which mind-body dualism is a part—has
become engrained in our societal structures, institutions, and broader culture.21
Within law, this conception of the rational, autonomous, self-transparent actor
has influenced fields as diverse as tort law, corporate law, criminal law,
discrimination law, and many others.22 Moreover, this model of human action
has been embraced by the dominant legal theoretic framework of the last forty
years, law and economics.23
In spite of its pervasiveness and potency, this model has been increasingly
contested by evidence from social psychology, social cognition, and cognitive
neuroscience, among other disciplines. Within the legal academy, critical
realists, behavioral realists, behavioral economists, and others have brought
insights from these sciences to offer a strong criticism of our legal system and
sound a call to unshackle our laws, procedures, and practices from the
manacles of our flawed notions of self, reason, agency, and causation.24

21. See powell & Menendian, supra note 11, at 1040–1043.
22. See, e.g., Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 11, at 13–20
(discussing the impact of the “dispositionist,” rational actor model on contract law, tort law, and
criminal law).
23. See, e.g., id. at 8–10, 139–44; see also Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Costs of
Dispositionism: The Premature Demise of Situationist Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 24,
33–35 (2005) (investigating how the dispositionist, rational actor model associated with Richard
Posner won out over the more situationally sensitive model associated with Guido Calabresi); Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical
Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 154 (2003) [hereinafter
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation] (exploring both the dominance of the rational actor model and
its profound failings).
24. To date, my work and the work of my coauthors in the Project on Law and Mind
Sciences has focused on employing the insights of social psychology and related fields to better
understand the origins of human behavior and, consequently, to build a more realistic account of
the human animal upon which legal analysis and theory can be grounded. For scholars involved
in the project (known as “critical realists” or “situationists”), engaging evidence from the mind
sciences means rejecting a commonsense dispositionist account of human action, based on a myth
of stable preferences, rationality, and free choice, in favor of an account acknowledging the
powerful role of situational factors—that is, generally unappreciated cognitive proclivities and
processes (interior situation) and external environmental/structural forces (exterior situation)—in
shaping behavior. For a sampling of this critical realist scholarship, see Hanson & Yosifon, The
Situation, supra note 23; Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America,
53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004) [hereinafter Benforado et al., Broken Scales]; Adam Benforado &
Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J.
499 (2008); Adam Benforado, The Geography of Criminal Law, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 823
(2010); Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. ___
(forthcoming 2010); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004); Ronald Chen
& Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate
Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 11.
The distinction between critical realism and other approaches has been explained as follows:
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As explored in other work, the process of reform has been an uphill
battle.25 It is not only that these commonsense ideas about what moves us are
deeply affirming and have been established over centuries, and that many of
the processes at work are beyond our conscious awareness or control, but also
that there are powerful entities that benefit greatly from maintaining the status
quo.26
That said, particularly over the last decade there has been real progress in
incorporating insights from the mind sciences into law and legal theory. The
important advances have to do both with the growing weight of the evidence
and the sophistication of the science, but also with the nature of the insights.
Much of this progress is in applying research that is surprising, but not entirely
unexpected or counterintuitive.27 Given the long history of explicit racism in
our country, for instance, it is not particularly shocking that implicit racial bias
should influence employers, police officers, and doctors.28 Likewise, research
on hedonic adaptation has many interesting applications, but the fundamental
insights—that humans are poor at affective forecasting and adjust to life

[L]aw and economics applies the rational actor model to all topics related to law, legal
institutions, and legal theory; economic behavioralism applies the boundedly rational
actor model to specific legal areas (e.g., products liability or employment law); behavioral
realism applies the situational character model to specific legal areas (particularly, thus
far, anti-discrimination law); and critical realism applies the situational character model to
that, as well as all topics related to law, legal institutions, and legal theory.
Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of
Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 316 n.3 (2008).
25. See, e.g., Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash: The Response of
Legal Theorists to Situationist Insights, 57 EMORY L.J. 1087 (2008) [hereinafter Benforado &
Hanson, Legal Academic Backlash].
26. See, e.g., Benforado et al., Broken Scales, supra note 24, at 1690–91 (exploring how an
engrained notion of autonomous, rational, self-transparent consumers exercising free choice helps
corporations such as fast food companies maximize profits and avoid liability and regulation).
27. Of course, what people find “surprising” may be changing as a result of the public’s
growing familiarity with insights from the mind sciences as a result of a wave of best-selling
psychology books aimed at popular audiences and increased media attention. See, e.g., DAN
ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008);
DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006); MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE
POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005); JONAH LEHRER, HOW WE DECIDE (2009);
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
28. See, e.g., John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt:
A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten
Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, in 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 47–50 (Barry
M. Staw & Arthur P. Brief eds., 2009); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law,
3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 430, 442 (2007). This is not to suggest that this research has not
been controversial or met with strong resistance. See Benforado & Hanson, Legal Academic
Backlash, supra note 25, at 1128–43.
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events, good or bad, are not unexpected.29 Similarly, our observations of
others’ behaviors ought to render research on the power of group influence on
persuasion rather expected.30 After all, we already tend to acknowledge that
attitudes towards social policies often seem to depend on the stated position of
a person’s political party rather than the objective content of the policies
(although we do not tend to acknowledge that we, ourselves, are influenced by
such group affiliations).
Just as important, the growing success of incorporating the insights of the
mind sciences into law, theory, and policy has to do with the fact that we have
discovered (and continue to discover) ways to apply the insights in concrete
ways that do not entirely destabilize or threaten the system. In a number of
cases, legal scholars have managed to negate the anxiety and discomfort
entailed in research that calls into question the legitimacy of our existing
institutions, structures, or process of justice, by offering the findings cautiously
(such that the footings of our legal system are shaken, but not irreparably
cracked) and by translating studies into readily implementable changes that
police departments, courts, and others can implement without throwing their
operations into disarray.31 For example, researchers challenging naïve models
of how memory works and suggesting that existing eyewitness identifications
were deeply flawed, were subsequently able to offer a set of reforms shown to
significantly increase identification reliability, including introducing sequential
lineups as an alternative to simultaneous lineups, choosing foils that all match
the witness’s initial description of the perpetrator, and having police officers
use open-ended questions rather than leading ones.32 The result was an 8000
word national guide for collecting and preserving eyewitness evidence
produced by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1999.33 Although the work
remains controversial, experts on implicit social cognition have offered similar,

29. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 750 (2007); John Bronsteen et al., Hedonic
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1526–28 (2008).
30. See, e.g., Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group
Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 808 (2003).
31. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful
Application of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 581, 595 (2000) (“With well over 1,000
publications on eyewitness issues since 1979 . . . psychologists were [primed] to assist the legal
system when the eyewitness issue came to the fore.”).
32. Id. at 585–93.
33. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999); see also OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (2003).
From the perspective of the eyewitness researchers, the Guide was imperfect because it did not
explicitly mandate the use of double-blind procedures or sequential lineups. Wells et al., supra
note 31, at 594–95. However, it opened the door for future innovations and shows the potential
for successful integration and application of mind sciences research. Id. at 595–96.
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relatively undisruptive, practical alterations to existing employment and other
practices to encourage direct debiasing, or to reduce the impact of existing
biases.34
One of the questions this Article attempts to address is whether the newest
mind sciences research shares (or is likely to share) these beneficial qualities
that have helped certain research gain acceptance. The field of embodied
cognition offers a glimpse of where we are going with our ongoing challenge
to Enlightenment thinking, and it may demonstrate some of the limits of using
insights from the mind sciences to shape our legal system.
I. EMBODIED COGNITION
A.

Overview

As suggested earlier, according to the embodied (or grounded) cognition
perspective, the body is involved in the constitution of the mind.35 Given that
the research is still very new, there is not yet a fully unified view of the field.36
But most embodied cognition researchers reject the conception of the brain as
a computer filled with amodal symbols that represent knowledge completely
apart from motor or sensory experiences.37 Rather, there is general agreement

34. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How the New Economics Can Improve
Employment Discrimination Law, and How Economics Can Survive the Demise of the “Rational
Actor,” 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 251–53 (2009) (offering an overview of some potentially
effective approaches based primarily on the work of Susan Fiske).
35. The phrases “embodied cognition” and “embodied grounding” are both used to refer to
the diverse set of research projects investigated in this Article. Lawrence Barsalou has suggested
that “grounded cognition” is preferable because “‘embodied cognition’ produces the mistaken
assumption that all researchers in this community believe that bodily states are necessary for
cognition and that these researchers focus exclusively on bodily states in their investigations.”
Barsalou, supra note 18, at 619. Accepting the validity of this critique, “embodied cognition” is
nonetheless chosen here to explicitly acknowledge and contest the foundations of Cartesian
dualism and because the term “grounding” may seem nebulous to those unfamiliar with the field.
In many ways, the modern origins of embodied cognition can be traced back to the efforts of
cognitive linguists studying metaphor. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson collaborated on two
seminal books in the area in which they asserted that abstract thought was grounded in bodily
experience and situations. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY
(1980); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND
AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) [hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH]. In Philosophy in the Flesh, they identified a set of “primary
metaphors” that seemed to reveal the power of physically grounded realities to our cognition,
including “affection is warmth,” “important is big,” “happy is up,” “bad is stinky,” “difficulties
are burdens,” and “categories are containers.” Id. at 50–54.
36. Barsalou, supra note 18, at 618, 620 (noting that “[c]onceptions of grounded cognition
take many different forms” and that “vagueness exists and misperceptions follow”).
37. Id. at 618 (“From the perspective of grounded cognition, it is unlikely that the brain
contains amodal symbols; if it does, they work together with modal representations to create
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in the modern embodiment community that (1) “cognitive events derive from
the types of experiences that come from having a body with particular
sensorimotor capacities,”38 (2) “the body helps to implement the mind in that
the conceptual system . . . relies on sensorimotor simulations,”39 and (3) “[n]ot
only does the body help to constitute the mind but so does the situation[.]”40
As Nils B. Jostmann, Daniël Lakens, and Thomas W. Schubert explain,
“Through schematization of experienced bodily states, people develop
perceptual representations of abstract concepts. Because the concrete sensory
experiences remain part of these representations, activation of these
experiences can influence mental simulation and abstract thought.”41
Consider, for example, that infants appear to have innate needs for close
physical contact with caregivers.42 Given that these needs appear to be even
more powerful than those related to nourishment,43 infants are likely to have an
extensive set of experiences with a friendly, helpful, and trustworthy caregiver
during their first months and years of existence. As an interaction occurs, the
brain captures information about perceptual, motor, and introspective states,
and, as a result, concepts—in this case, physical warmth and interpersonal
warmth—become mentally associated.44 A later experience with physical
warmth may reactivate the earlier mental association (multimodal
representation), leading to impressions of interpersonal warmth.45

cognition.”); Gün R. Semin & John T. Cacioppo, Grounding Social Cognition: Synchronization,
Coordination, and Co-Regulation, in EMBODIED GROUNDING: SOCIAL, COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE,
AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC APPROACHES, supra note 6, at 119, 139–40 (explaining how “the notion
of the solitary computer now seems antiquated”).
38. Barrett & Lindquist, supra note 6, at 246.
39. Id. “Simulation is the reenactment of perceptual, motor, and introspective states
acquired during experience with the world, body, and mind.” Barsalou, supra note 18, at 618.
40. Barrett & Lindquist, supra note 6, at 247. “From this perspective, the cognitive system
evolved to support action in specific situations, including social interaction. These accounts
stress interactions between perception, action, the body, the environment, and other agents,
typically during goal achievement.” Barsalou, supra note 18, at 619.
41. Nils B. Jostmann et al., Weight as an Embodiment of Importance, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI.
1169, 1169–70 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
42. See, e.g., Harry F. Harlow, The Nature of Love, 13 AM. PSYCHOL. 673, 675–85 (1958)
(describing a set of experiments with infant macaque monkeys showing the primary importance
of contact comfort); 1 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS 210–34 (1969) (describing
attachment behavior in infant humans and other animals).
43. See Harlow, supra note 42, at 676–77 (noting that “contact comfort . . . overshadow[ed]
. . . the variable of nursing” in the infant macaque monkey experiments).
44. See Barsalou, supra note 18, at 618 (“[T]he brain captures states across the modalities
and integrates them with a multimodal representation stored in memory . . . .”); Lawrence E.
Williams & John A. Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes Interpersonal Warmth, 322
SCIENCE 606, 606–07 (2008) [hereinafter Williams & Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth].
45. See Barsalou, supra note 18, at 618–19.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1196

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:1185

To gain a better understanding of how embodied cognition works in
practice, this Article now takes up three very recent sets of experiments in
detail (starting with one exploring the warmth association, just discussed),
before moving to a broader consideration of current and future embodied
cognition research.
B.

Three Experiments
1.

Warmth

Imagine that you sign up to participate in a social psychology experiment.
On the appointed morning, you go to the laboratory and are met in the lobby
by an experimenter, who has her hands full with a coffee, clipboard, and two
books.46 As you ride the elevator up to the fourth-floor laboratory, she asks if
you could hold the coffee as she begins to fill in your name and start time.47
At the end of the ride, she takes back the coffee and you go into the
experimental room to fill out a personality impression questionnaire in which
you rate an individual on personality traits after reading a short description of
the person.48
It turns out that the variable in the experiment was what you were holding
as you rode the elevator.49 In one condition, participants were primed by
holding a cup of hot coffee; in the other, it was a cup of iced coffee.50
Although the exposure only lasted ten to twenty-five seconds,51 that small
alteration in bodily experience mattered: “[P]eople who had briefly held the
hot coffee cup perceived the target person as being significantly warmer . . .
than did those who had briefly held the cup of iced coffee” and the temperature
of the beverage “did not affect ratings on traits unrelated to the warm-cold

46. Williams & Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth, supra note 44, at 607.
47. Id.
48. Lawrence E. Williams & John A. Bargh, Supporting Online Material for Experiencing
Physical Warmth Promotes Interpersonal Warmth, SCIENCE 2–3 (2008), http://www.science
mag.org/cgi/data/322/5901/606/DC1/1 [hereinafter Williams & Bargh, Supporting Online
Material].
Specifically, they were told that “Person A is intelligent, skillful, and industrious. Person
A is also determined, practical, and cautious.” Participants then rated Person A on ten
personality traits using 7-point bipolar scales anchored by a trait and its opposite. Five of
these scales were related to the warm-cold distinction: generous/ungenerous,
happy/unhappy, good-natured/irritable, sociable/anti-social, and caring/selfish. The
remaining scales were unrelated to the warm-cold distinction: attractive/unattractive,
carefree/serious, talkative/quiet, strong/weak, and honest/dishonest.
Id.
49. Williams & Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth, supra note 44, at 607.
50. Id.
51. Williams & Bargh, Supporting Online Material, supra note 48, at 2.
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dimension.”52 Moreover, participants had no idea that physical experience
affected their judgments.53
In a subsequent experiment, the same researchers found that experiences of
physical temperature impact not only judgments as to interpersonal warmth,
but also the warmth of behavior towards others.54 In the second experiment,
individuals held “either [a] hot or cold therapeutic pad under the guise of
[conducting] a product evaluation” and then were given a choice of a reward
for their participation.55 One of the rewards was a “prosocial gift to ‘treat a
friend’” and the other was “a personal reward for the participants
themselves.”56 As it turned out, experiences of physical temperature had an
effect on prosocial behavior towards other people: “[P]articipants primed with
physical coldness were more likely to choose the gift for themselves (75%)
than the gift for a friend (25%), whereas those primed with physical warmth
were more likely to choose a gift for a friend (54%) than the gift for
themselves (46%).”57
The researchers suggest the dynamic has to do with a part of the brain
called the insular cortex that is involved in “both the sensation of one’s
physiological state (such as skin temperature) and the detection of
[interpersonal warmth and] trustworthiness of others.”58 The robustness of the
connection between concrete physical experiences of temperature and abstract
psychological concepts is evidenced by the fact that warm-cold metaphors can
be bidirectional: if ambient temperature can influence someone’s perception
and evaluation of social interactions, someone’s social experience can
influence the perception of temperature.59 In one set of recent experiments, for

52. Williams & Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth, supra note 44, at 607 (“The effect of
the coffee manipulation was specific to feelings of interpersonal warmth and was not a general
mood or ‘halo’ effect.”).
53. Id. “According to recent theory and research in social cognition, interpersonal warmth
refers to a constellation of traits related to perceived favorability of the other person’s intentions
toward us, including friendliness, helpfulness, and trustworthiness.” Id. at 606 (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 607.
55. Id.
56. Id. (“The framing condition was counterbalanced such that half of participants chose
between a Snapple reward for themselves and a gift certificate reward for a friend, and the other
half chose between a Snapple reward for a friend and a gift certificate reward for themselves.”).
57. Williams & Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth, supra note 44, at 607.
58. Id.; see also Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg, Trust Me on This, 321 SCIENCE 778, 779
(2008) (“The anterior insula is traditionally associated with sensing the physiological state of the
body, but strongly reacts to adverse or uncomfortable occurrences in social interactions, such as
unfairness, risky choices, frustration, or impending loss of social status. This brain region also
responds to the intentions and emotional state of others, and imbues them with feeling.”)
(citations omitted).
59. Chen-Bo Zhong & Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Cold and Lonely: Does Social Exclusion
Literally Feel Cold?, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 838, 839 (2008).
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example, investigators “found that people literally felt cold . . . or preferred
warm food . . . when they experienced being socially excluded.”60
2.

Weight

Having enjoyed your first taste of the exciting world of social psychology
experiments, you sign up for another. This time, after arriving at the
laboratory, you are led into a room and handed a questionnaire, attached to a
clipboard, asking you to appraise the value of six foreign currencies61 or to
assess the importance of “having a voice in a decision-making procedure.”62
You fill in the survey and then hand it back to the experimenter.63
This time, the variable that was altered was the weight of the clipboard—
half of the participants were given a clipboard with an empty storage
compartment (for a total weight of 1.45 pounds) and half were given a
clipboard with a storage compartment filled with paper (for a total weight of
2.29 pounds).64 Although the difference was less than a pound, the physical
experience of the weight of the clipboard influenced the relevant judgments of
the volunteers: “[P]articipants who held a heavy clipboard estimated the
currencies to be more valuable” and found having a voice in the referenced
decision-making procedure to be more important than participants who held a
light clipboard.65 Physical weight appeared to be linked to the perceived
“weightiness”—or importance—of issues.66
In subsequent experiments, researchers found that although weight had no
impact on mood or perceived pleasantness or difficulty of the task, it did
“influence[] how people deal[t] with abstract issues much as it influenc[ed]
how people deal[t] with concrete objects: It le[d] to greater investment of
effort.”67 As the investigators explained, increased weight resulted in “greater
elaboration of thought, as indicated by greater consistency between related
judgments, greater polarization between judgments of strong versus weak
arguments, and greater confidence in one’s opinion.”68

60. Id. at 840.
61. Jostmann et al., supra note 41, at 1170 (“Participants were to guess how many euros
were needed to purchase each stated quantity of foreign currency.”).
62. Id. at 1171 (Participants were “presented [with] a short scenario in which a university
committee denied students the opportunity to express their opinions regarding the size of a grant
to study abroad. Participants indicated how important it was for them that the committee would
listen to the opinion of the students.”) (citations omitted).
63. See id. at 1170–71.
64. Id. at 1170.
65. Id. at 1171.
66. Jostmann et al., supra note 41, at 1173.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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These findings have been bolstered by a parallel experiment by another set
of psychologists in which participants evaluated a psychology job candidate
while using a light or heavy clipboard and then reported how important they
deemed it was to make a correct evaluation.69 The researchers found that those
given the heavy clipboard viewed the candidate more favorably, assessed the
candidate to be more serious about the position, and felt that making an
accurate assessment was more important than those with a light clipboard.70
3.

Cleanliness

Now a committed test subject, you return for a third and final experiment
at the laboratory where you are led into a room to watch a disgusting threeminute scene from the movie Trainspotting.71 As the next participant is
brought in, you are taken into a second room, a staff room, that must be kept
extremely clean and are asked to wash your hands before sitting down to assess
a set of six moral dilemmas: “eating one’s dead dog,” “switching the tracks of
a trolley to kill one workman instead of five,” “keeping money inside a found
wallet,” “killing a terminally ill plane crash survivor to avoid starvation,”
“putting false information on a résumé,” and “using a kitten for sexual
arousal.”72 You rate each based on how wrong you believe the action to be
and are then asked to remember back to watching the film and record how you
felt using an emotion rating scale.73
Previous research has shown “a causal relationship between feelings of
physical disgust [as would be prompted by watching the gross movie clip,
being exposed to a bad smell, or working in a disgusting room] and moral
condemnation . . . regardless of whether the action to be judged is itself
disgusting.”74 In this experiment, the variable that was manipulated was
whether or not participants were asked to wash their hands after being primed
for disgust. It turned out that “hand washing reduced feelings of disgust,
69. Joshua M. Ackerman et al., Feeling It: Haptic Priming Effects in Impression Formation 1
(2009) (unpublished report, on file with author and the Saint Louis University Law Journal).
70. Id.
71. Simone Schnall et al., With a Clean Conscience: Cleanliness Reduces the Severity of
Moral Judgments, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1219, 1221 (2008) [hereinafter Schnall et al., Clean
Conscience].
72. Id. at 1220–21.
73. Id. at 1221.
74. Simone Schnall et al., Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment, 34 PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1096, 1105 (2008) [hereinafter Schnall et al., Disgust]. Schnall and his coauthors have
also documented that (1) while disgust appears to impact moral judgments, it does not impact
additional nonmoral judgments; (2) inducing other negative affect (e.g., sadness) does not
similarly impact moral judgments; and (3) the influence of disgust on amplifying moral
judgments is strongest in those subjects who are most sensitive to their own bodily sensations
(providing evidence that “feelings of disgust rather than merely the primed concept of disgust”
were behind the experimental results). Id. at 1105–06.
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which in turn reduced the severity of the moral judgments” in the various
scenarios.75 As the researchers concluded, “Our findings support the notion
that purity can serve as a basic intuition when judging the moral quality of an
action: People appear to have intuitions about moral transgressions that go
beyond principles of harm or fairness.”76
Even with respect to people’s own actions, physical cleansing seems to
impact moral assessments, “alleviat[ing] the upsetting consequences of
unethical behavior and reduc[ing] threats to one’s moral self-image.”77 In
another study, participants first described a previous unethical thing that they
had done and then either used an antiseptic wipe to clean their hands or did
not.78 People who had physically cleansed themselves were shown both to be
“less motivated to volunteer [for a subsequent experiment without pay]
because the sanitation wipes had already washed away their moral stains and
restored a suitable moral self” and left them more likely to report reduced
“moral emotions (i.e., disgust, regret, guilt, shame, embarrassment and anger
. . .”).79 As with the processing of information about physical warmth and
interpersonal warmth, the experiences of physical and moral disgust appears to
recruit similar brain regions, particularly in the temporal and frontal lobes.80
C. The Broader Field
The experiments on warmth, weight, and cleanliness present only three
areas of current embodied cognition research. To get a more complete sense of
the scope of the field, it is worth briefly considering how other sensorimotor
experiences related to position, size, distance, shape, and texture also appear
associated with psychological constructs beyond our conscious awareness.
There is now empirical evidence that such experiences influence—among
other things—perception, memory, conceptual processing, thought, emotion,
and social cognition.81
The position and condition of our body can affect our perception even in
situations where our implicated primary senses are not impaired (e.g., where
we are able to observe all seemingly relevant aspects of the scene). As Dennis
R. Proffitt summarizes,

75. Schnall et al., Clean Conscience, supra note 71, at 1221. “[T]he effect of the rather
subtle manipulations was substantial, with medium to large effect sizes.” Id. at 1222.
76. Id.
77. Chen-Bo Zhong & Katie Liljenquist, Washing Away Your Sins: Threatened Morality and
Physical Cleansing, 313 SCIENCE 1451, 1451 (2006).
78. Id. at 1452.
79. Id. “Handwashing, however, did not influence nonmoral emotions.” Id.
80. Jorge Moll et al., The Moral Affiliations of Disgust: A Functional MRI Study, 18
COGNITIVE & BEHAV. NEUROLOGY 68, 68 (2005).
81. See Barsalou, supra note 18, at 623–31.
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Under constant viewing conditions, the apparent incline of hills increases when
people are tired or encumbered by wearing a heavy backpack; hills also appear
steeper to people who are in poor physical condition or who are elderly and in
declining health, compared with those who are young, healthy, and fit.
Similarly, apparent distance increases when the observer is encumbered by a
backpack or throwing a heavy ball. When one is standing on a high balcony,
the apparent distance to the ground is positively correlated with one’s fear of
82
heights.

Moreover, researchers have found that participants struggle to accurately
assess the weight of something lifted by another without experiencing for
themselves the peripheral sensation entailed in simulating the lifting action.83
Thus, we do not simply “see” the world as it actually is, we “see” the world
through the lens of our bodies.
This is also true with respect to how we reason. When people think about
an abstract domain like time, they inevitably rely on their experiences in
space.84 In one study, participants were asked which day of the week a
rescheduled meeting would occur if a Wednesday gathering had been “moved
forward two days.”85 The participants’ answers depended on their current
spatial trajectories: participants thinking of moving through space answered
“Friday,” while participants imagining elements in the environment coming
toward them answered “Monday.” 86
Sensorimotor experiences are also connected to affect. In one study,
researchers “found that negative evaluations of stimuli biased selective
attention in a downwards direction, consistent with metaphorical associations
between negative evaluations and vertical position (e.g., Heaven is up and Hell
is down).”87 In another study, the same investigators found that people with
depressive symptoms had downward-biased selective attention—in other
words, individuals who were feeling “down” literally looked down.88

82. Dennis R. Proffitt, Embodied Perception and the Economy of Action, 1 PERSP. PSYCHOL.
SCI. 110, 110 (2006).
83. Simone Bosbach et al., Inferring Another’s Expectation from Action: The Role of
Peripheral Sensation, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1295, 1296–97 (2005).
84. Lera Boroditsky & Michael Ramscar, The Roles of Body and Mind in Abstract Thought,
13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 185 (2002).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Brian P. Meier & Michael D. Robinson, Does “Feeling Down” Mean Seeing Down?
Depressive Symptoms and Vertical Selective Attention, 40 J. RES. PERSONALITY 451, 458 (2006)
(citing Brian P. Meier & Michael D. Robinson, Why the Sunny Side Is Up: Associations Between
Affect and Vertical Position, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 243, 243–47 (2004)).
88. Id. at 459–60 (“Considering causal direction, we believe that the relation is bidirectional.”). The “up/good” and “bad/down” dynamic is not the only implicated vertical spatial
dimension simulation. “[T]he social concept of power is [also] embodied in vertical spatial
positions[:]” “high power” groups are associated with “up” and “low power” groups are
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In addition, bodily states can both result from social cognition and cause
social cognition.89 With respect to the former, experimental participants
primed with stereotypes about the elderly, for example, later walked down the
hall slower than unprimed subjects (demonstrating unintended mimicry).90
With respect to the latter, an individual’s posture, facial expression, or bodily
actions can impact his feelings and impressions. Thus, “people feel prouder if
they assume an upright posture as compared with a body position in which the
upper part of the body is bent over.”91 Likewise, participants allowed to
engage the facial musculature involved in smiling as a result of holding a pen
between their teeth rate cartoons as funnier than those who are inhibited from
smiling as a result of holding a pen with their lips.92 And performing a
“pushing away” motion (as opposed to a “pulling towards” motion) has been
shown to cause people to rate a neutral, unrelated stimulus as more positive,93
just as nodding one’s head vertically (as opposed to shaking one’s head
horizontally) has been shown to increase agreement with the editorial content
of a radio show.94
More recently, researchers have found that the handling of smooth versus
rough puzzle pieces affects the way people characterize ambiguous social
interactions—those experiencing physical roughness interpret interactions as
“rougher” in the sense of being more competitive, argumentative, and less
coordinated.95 Similarly, ongoing research suggests that the experience of

associated with “down.” Thomas W. Schubert, Your Highness: Vertical Positions as Perceptual
Symbols of Power, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 16 (2005).
89. Barsalou, supra note 18, at 630.
90. See Ap Dijksterhuis & John A. Bargh, The Perception-Behavior Expressway: Automatic
Effects of Social Perception on Social Behavior, in 33 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 17–18 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2001).
91. Sabine Stepper & Fritz Strack, Proprioceptive Determinants of Emotional and
Nonemotional Feelings, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 211, 215 (1993).
92. Fritz Strack et al., Inhibiting and Facilitating Conditions of the Human Smile: A
Nonobtrusive Test of the Facial Feedback Hypothesis, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 768,
775 (1988); see also Francesco Foroni & Gün R. Semin, Language That Puts You in Touch With
Your Bodily Feelings, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 974, 979 (“The subliminal presentation of verbs
referring to facial expressions of positive and negative emotion shapes readers’ evaluation of
cartoons . . . [but] the differential pattern of judgments was not found when participants’ facial
muscle movement was blocked.”).
93. John T. Cacioppo et al., Rudimentary Determinants of Attitudes. II: Arm Flexion and
Extension Have Differential Effects on Attitudes, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5
(1993).
94. Gary L. Wells & Richard E. Petty, The Effects of Overt Head Movements on Persuasion:
Compatibility and Incompatibility of Responses, 1 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 219, 219
(1980).
95. Ackerman et al., supra note 69.
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physical hardness (e.g., sitting in an old wooden chair) may prime impressions
that tasks are more difficult.96
Overall, the field of embodied cognition has greatly expanded our
understanding of the interrelationship between our minds and our bodies, but
much is still to come. There are many hypotheses left to be tested and
numerous findings left to be expanded and replicated in the coming years and
decades. As those investigations continue, we will move ever closer to a goal
Descartes shared: true self-knowledge.
D. The Unlicensed Cognitive Expert
Although the focus of this Article has been on the work of neuroscientists,
social psychologists, and other scientists, it is worth noting that some nonscientists are well aware that manipulating bodily states can change the way
people see, think, feel, and act. Marketers, for example, although they often
lack the sophistication and more complex understanding of social
psychologists, are quite familiar with the fact that things like the temperature
of a supermarket, the smell of fresh flowers at an open house, and the smooth
edges of a product can have an impact on sales.97 As the webpage of the
public relations behemoth Burston-Marsteller once proclaimed: “Perceptions
are real[.] They color what we see . . . what we believe . . . how we behave.
They can be managed . . . to motivate behavior . . . to create positive business
results.”98 Things as seemingly irrelevant as packaging can prompt powerful
judgments about a product: “[T]he firmness of a cup in which water is served
may affect consumers’ judgments of the water itself.”99 Given the sums of
money at stake, it makes perfect sense that companies would pay just as much
attention as scientists to things like the influence of haptic cues.100

96. Drake Bennett, Thinking Literally: The Surprising Ways that Metaphors Shape Your
World, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 2009, at K1 (discussing an ongoing study by Josh Ackerman).
97. See, e.g., Benforado et al., Broken Scales, supra note 24, at 1691–1707 (discussing
various situational manipulations used by food companies to increase sales).
98. SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US, WE’RE EXPERTS!: HOW INDUSTRY
MANIPULATES SCIENCE AND GAMBLES WITH YOUR FUTURE 2 (2001) (quoting BursonMarsteller, Inc., http://www.bm.com (Sept. 27, 1997)).
99. Aradhna Krishna & Maureen Morrin, Does Touch Affect Taste? The Perceptual Transfer
of Product Container Haptic Cues, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 807, 807 (2008); see also id. at 816
(“[Certain participants] were more likely to evaluate a mineral water more negatively when
touching a flimsy disposable cup (vs. a firm cup or vs. not touching the cup), and willing to pay a
higher price for bottled water described as being sold in a firm (vs. flimsy) bottle”).
100. As marketing professors Aradhna Krishna and Maureen Morrin describe, “Firms such as
McDonald’s, Starbucks, and Dunkin’ Donuts spend millions of dollars on disposable cups and
bottles each year. If such firms try to save on costs by using haptically inferior packaging, this
could affect consumers’ perceptions of the taste or quality of the beverages they contain.” Id. at
817.
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Teachers, police officers, waiters, and regular citizens may also have an
intuitive sense that influencing certain bodily states and experiences can
impact the way people think or behave. Dimming the lights in the classroom
cuts down on loud talking. Friendly touching of patrons results in bigger tips.
Wearing your police cap results in more deferential treatment. Research in
embodied cognition is invaluable because it helps to sort out those folk insights
that are based in fact from those based in fiction.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
A.

Overview

Even granting the usefulness of understanding embodied cognition for
corporate entities and certain occupations, for many it may not be evident that
this work is particularly relevant to law or legal theory. Indeed, the
experiments showing that abstract concepts may be primed by physical
experiences beyond our conscious awareness may seem more appropriate for a
witty cocktail conversation than for the pages of a law review. How could any
of this actually matter for real lawyers, judges, and clients?
The answer is that embodied cognition does not differentiate between legal
actors and nonlegal actors. We are all creatures of our bodies, whether we
wear a robe, a suit, or sandals. And although this research is still in its early
stages, work in embodied cognition has the potential to upend the way we
think about our judicial system. But even a preliminary consideration of
applications within the legal sphere shows the potential challenges of taking
this research seriously and trying to use it to develop concrete strategies.
Given space constraints, this Article addresses but one of the many areas—
the courtroom101—where the findings of embodied cognition research raise
important questions for our legal processes, structures, and practices.102
In certain ways, the analysis that follows may harmonize with the
intuitions of longtime trial attorneys who, like the teachers, police officers, and
waiters mentioned above, have accrued, through repeated interactions and
observations, an arsenal of tactics and behaviors related to bodily cues that
seem to “work” in court. A seasoned defense attorney may know that details
101. For purposes of this Article, the “courtroom” is construed in the broad sense: the focus is
on the experiences and interactions of trial and appellate judges, jurors, law clerks, witnesses, and
lawyers both in the courtroom itself and around the courthouse (e.g., in chambers, panel
meetings, and deliberations). This exploration is consonant with other recent work investigating
some of the ways that “[p]hysical space relationships and boundaries within the courtroom may
. . . matter in terms of the outcome of a trial.” Benforado, The Geography of Criminal Law, supra
note 24.
102. In future work, I hope to look at the impact of embodied cognition in other legal arenas,
including police practices, corporate decision-making, business and diplomatic negotiation, and
prison design.
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that are seemingly irrelevant to the merits of the case, like where he stands,
what gestures he makes, and how he dresses, are often critical to the outcome.
The recent research on embodied cognition suggests that some of these
intuitions may not be so far off. Consider, again, the three experiments
explored in detail in this Article.103
B.

Experiments in Context
1.

Warmth

Research on the processing of information in the insular cortex related to
both physical warmth and interpersonal warmth suggests that temperature
effects in the courtroom may be very important. In particular, cold or warm
primes may impact, among other things, assessments of others (including
witnesses, plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, and judges), prosocial behavior,
and group dynamics.
When it comes to first impressions, psychologists have discovered that the
evaluation of a person’s warmth and competence are the two most dominant
dimensions of one’s assessment of another’s social behaviors, accounting for
82% of the variance.104 Moreover, as Lawrence Williams and John Bargh
explain, “Of these two fundamental dimensions, warmth is primary, as ‘people
are more sensitive to warmth information than to competence information’ and
make trustworthiness judgments of faces faster than for other traits, including
competence.”105
The courtroom is a world of first impressions—in most cases, the key
players are strangers coming together for a short period of time. And
assessments of trustworthiness and character are critical to outcomes in both
the civil and criminal contexts. These evaluations inevitably play a significant
role in allocating fault and determining guilt, among other things. Do we
believe this witness? Is the defendant the type of person who could commit
such an act? How much weight should we place on what that attorney just
said? Is that judge being mean to the witness or lawyer? As it turns out, jurors
are not the only ones making these potentially temperature-sensitive appraisals.
Judges and law clerks are also assessing behavior as they watch the parties,
their attorneys, the witnesses, and in chambers as they read over briefs,
motions, and other items in the record.
103. Bearing in mind the preliminary nature of many of the findings explored in this Article,
the following section is not meant to offer firm conclusions or offer concrete policy prescriptions.
Rather, the intent is to draw out some of the potential applications of embodied cognition
research, which should help frame future hypotheses as investigations continue.
104. Williams & Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth, supra note 44, at 606 (citations
omitted).
105. Id. (quoting Susan T. Fiske, Amy J.C. Cutty & Peter Glick, Universal Trends in Social
Cognition: Warmth and Competence, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 77, 79 (2007)).
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Not only are there many opportunities for interpersonal judgment in the
courtroom, there are also many chances for prosocial actions. The research on
physical warmth suggests that temperature may influence the leniency of
judges ruling on motions or at sentencing.106 A judge subject to a warm prime
may be more willing to grant an extension for a filing or be more likely to set a
lower bail. Likewise, physical warmth may have an impact on the amount of
damages awarded in civil cases. Just as participants in the heating pad
experiment were significantly more willing to give a gift to another under a
warm condition than a cold condition, jurors may be more generous when they
are exposed to warmth.107 On the appellate level, experienced temperature
may influence the willingness of judges to defer to lower courts or agencies,
with cold bodily states leading to decreased trust in others’ determinations and
a decreased desire to accommodate others’ perspectives.
The sensory experience of temperature may also matter with respect to the
various group dynamics inside the courthouse, whether during settlements
between parties, jury deliberations, or judicial conferences following oral
arguments. Since coldness has been linked to the experience of social
rejection, and social rejection has been shown to induce hostile reactivity
toward others, the danger of interpersonal friction to group cohesiveness and
effectiveness may depend critically on temperature dynamics.108 It is
plausible, for example, that juries and judicial panels subject to warm
temperatures are not only more congenial and unanimous, but that they also
reach consensus more quickly. Similarly, parties in a civil suit may be more
likely to spurn settlement talks and proceed to trial when experiencing physical
coldness.
Despite the wonders of modern climate control technology, jurors, judges,
witnesses, plaintiffs, defendants, lawyers, and law clerks may nonetheless be
subject to temperature effects in many different ways. Williams and Bargh’s
research suggests that we should be conscious of the food and drinks that court
participants are consuming at key points and that we need to consider whether
certain items are consumed disproportionately at certain times of day. Judges
may be more lenient when they have a warm cup of tea on the bench than
when they are sipping a glass of ice water, and jurors drinking cold sodas
during deliberations may feel less generous to a plaintiff seeking damages. If
people are more likely to drink coffee in the morning and a cold drink in the
afternoon, something as seemingly inconsequential as scheduling may be
having an impact on outcomes.109 Furthermore, the heating pad experiment
implies that the amount of clothes parties are wearing may also be important,

106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 607.
See id.
See Zhong & Leonardelli, supra note 59, at 841 (citations omitted).
See Williams & Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth, supra note 44, at 607.
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whether it is a judge donning a robe over her clothes or a juror who keeps her
coat on while sitting in the jury box.110 Finally, the ambient temperature
research suggests that we may need to worry about the temperature of the
courtroom.111 And it suggests that it may matter whether a trial takes place in
summer versus winter, or if the trial is located in Florida versus Maine. As a
result of jurisdictional variability, geography has always been important to
plaintiffs and defendants—in terms of substantive rules, prosecutorial
discretion, conviction rates, sentencing, and other factors112—but the insights
of embodied cognition suggest that it may be affecting outcomes in a
heretofore unappreciated fashion.113
2.

Weight

The research exploring the metaphorical connection between the physical
experience of weight and impressions of seriousness and importance suggests
that heaviness may be having an impact on how judges, jurors, law clerks,
lawyers, witnesses, and parties view their roles, assess others, and perceive
issues.
With respect to role behavior, the work discussed earlier reveals that
feeling greater physical weight may encourage the implicated legal actors to
give more cautious and considered answers to the questions they are posed.114
Weight may not only prime judges, jurors, and other courtroom participants for
greater elaboration of thought,115 but it may also make individuals view
accuracy in their task as more important.116 This might be beneficial to the
extent that jurors, for example, are encouraged to appreciate the vital
importance of their task and work harder to carefully think through the issues.
Yet the same dynamic might also be detrimental if weight experiences

110. See id.
111. See Zhong & Leonardelli, supra note 59, at 841.
112. See generally Benforado, The Geography of Criminal Law, supra note 24.
113. To a certain degree embodied cognition research may offer some empirical support for
centuries-old notions that variations in climate and other elements of the physical environment
influence legal systems. See, e.g., Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Law and Geography, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 641 (David S. Clark ed., 2007);
CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 23 (Thomas
Nugent trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1748) (“[T]he political and civil laws of each nation . . .
should be in relation to the climate of each country”). However, none of the discussion in this
Article is meant to suggest the magnitude of temperature effects in comparison to other
implicated variables. Thus, although this Article asserts that environmental factors—including
climate—that affect our bodies and bodily experiences should not be ignored, this project cannot
be considered a work of environmental (or geographical) determinism.
114. See Jostmann et al., supra note 41, at 1173.
115. See id.
116. See Ackerman et al., supra note 69.
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encourage individuals to harden their views and become less persuadable.117 If
this is the case, weightiness might have the effect of encouraging deadlock in
jury deliberations, appellate judicial panels, and settlement negotiations.
Concerning the influence of haptic priming on interpersonal assessments,
the research implies that “experienced weight” might prompt legal actors to
view expert witnesses as more serious and qualified.118 And the same dynamic
should extend to assessments of other key individuals. Consequently, weight
may impact how deferential the parties are to the judge or how much “weight”
jurors give to a judge’s jury instructions. It may also impact how jurors or
appellate judges on a panel view one another.
The work of those studying the impact of weight on priming goals and
concepts also suggests that the way legal participants view particular issues or
entire cases may turn, in part, on the “heaviness” they experience at key
moments. Experiencing greater weight may encourage a juror to view a harm
that was committed as more serious or a judge to view a constitutional right as
more fundamental.119 In addition, in light of the experiment on currency
valuation, the experience of weight might have an impact on the amount that
plaintiffs collect.120 It might be, for example, that judges exposed to greater
weight tend to approve larger settlements.
There are many opportunities for legal actors to “feel” the weight of the
case as a result of the clothes they wear, the tools they use, and the materials
they are provided. Again, it is important to remember that the weights
involved in the embodied cognition experiments were actually very small.121 It
is possible that something as seemingly negligible as a judge’s robe or a juror’s
jacket might have an impact on assessments.122 Concerning the tools used by
judges and jurors, it is worth considering the effect of varying the weights of
clipboards, coffee cups, gavels, phones, briefcases, bags, and countless other

117. See Jostmann et al., supra note 41, at 1173 (suggesting that weight can lead to “greater
confidence in one’s opinion”).
118. See id.
119. See id. In future research, it would be interesting to consider how weight primes operate
when, as in most cases, there are competing rights or interests being asserted, either set of which
may be viewed as more or less fundamental.
120. See id. at 1171.
121. See id. at 1170.
122. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, it would be interesting to explore the
regalia of judges in different cultures given embodied cognition research. Some cultures have
traditionally instituted quite elaborate sartorial requirements likely to have a significant impact on
bodily experience while in court. In England and Wales, for example, High Court judges dealing
with Queen’s Bench work traditionally wore a black silk gown and short wig when sitting in the
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). A Lord Chancellor’s Department Consultation Paper,
Court Working Dress in England and Wales (2003), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/
courtdress/index.htm. However, “[a] Queen’s Bench judge trying civil cases in winter w[ore] a
black robe faced with fur, a black scarf and girdle and a scarlet tippet.” Id.
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items. One researcher has already suggested that something as minimal as the
heaviness of a pen may impact the way people behave in important
interactions.123 With respect to materials, prosecutors may implicitly cue an
appreciation of the “gravity” of the crime by allowing the jury to pass around a
heavy bit of evidence. Potentially more important is the weight of various
documents provided to judges, juries, and law clerks. With tight schedules and
substantial caseloads, judges and law clerks often take materials home with
them. The briefs and other documents in a single administrative appeal, for
example, may add ten or more pounds to a law clerk’s bag. And when that law
clerk goes to read or type up notes or memos, she is likely to have the joint
appendix in her lap. During oral arguments, both the judge and the clerks will
often be handling the documents. Do appellate law clerks or judges treat cases
with heavier joint appendixes or briefs more seriously? Do they spend more
time on them? Do Supreme Court cases with a heavy stack of amici receive
greater attention solely because they have provoked more attention from the
public and raise more important issues or also, in part, because they are heavier
to carry around?
All of this may lend support to those advocating for more court business—
including the filing of documents—being handled electronically. Such reforms
may provide for more even treatment of cases. But it can also be argued that
although eliminating weight disparities may be advantageous, lightening the
loads of courtroom actors across the board may not be. To encourage judges,
jurors, and law clerks to take their tasks more seriously, it may actually make
sense to increase weight sensations by, for example, using heavier paper,
binding more official documents, providing heavier pens, or discouraging the
use of Internet resources in favor of traditional bound case reporters.
3.

Cleanliness

The experiments on physical cleanliness and disgust raise some of the most
serious concerns for our justice system because they suggest that the
experience of one’s body may have a direct impact on judgments as to the
immorality of actions by others. This, in turn, may influence decisive
determinations at trial: Is this person guilty of a crime worthy of punishment?
Should this individual be imprisoned or released on parole? How much should
this party be forced to pay to the victim to atone for his transgression? Was the
victim partially to blame for the bad outcome? What is the character of this
witness or defendant?
As discussed previously, “extraneously induced disgust makes moral
judgment more severe”124 and there are many ways that judges, jurors, clerks,

123. See Bennett, supra note 96 (discussing Nils Jostmann’s scholarship).
124. Schnall et al., Disgust, supra note 74, at 1102.
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and others may be primed with feelings of disgust, both inadvertently and
deliberately. First, a messy or foul-smelling courtroom, deliberation room, or
courthouse bathroom may impact judges and jurors, just as the area outside of
the courthouse may influence them.125 It is possible that when a courthouse is
undergoing renovations or located downwind from a paper mill or chemical
plant, defendants may face more negative outcomes.126 Second, the smell,
grooming, and overall physical appearance of a party, witness, or lawyer may
have a significant influence on the implicated morality assessments of that
person.127 This aligns with the commonsense advice of seasoned defense
attorneys—shower, suit, and shave—although many lawyers appear to believe
that the mechanism has to do with conveying “respect” for the court.128 Third,
attorneys may actively prime disgust by having witnesses or victims provide
graphic narration of gruesome details of the case or by introducing particular
physical evidence (e.g., a bloody knife) or documentary evidence (e.g., a
horrific video of an attack or a photograph of the crime scene).129 Again, many
prosecutors are aware that such tactics are effective although they do not
necessarily understand the precise cause.
If there is a multiplicity of opportunities for judges and jurors to be primed
with feelings of disgust, there are also numerous occasions for moral

125. See id. at 1098–99, 1102, 1105–06 (detailing how test subjects made harsher moral
judgments after researchers primed them for disgust with foul odors or dirty surroundings).
126. See id. at 1098–99. It is also conceivable that incidents during trial involving other
participants may prime disgust (e.g., a juror with a hacking cough who does not cover his mouth
or a nervous witness who vomits while up on the stand).
127. See id. at 1098–99, 1102, 1105–06.
128. The Charles Johnson Law Firm offers the following advice:
When in court it is in your best interest to look your very best for the judge, jury,
prosecutor, and yourself. It psychologically helps you in court with your case and can
heighten your chances of winning if you look like you are serious about the proceedings
and play the part.
People who go to court in shorts and sandals will not get the same treatment that a
person in a suit or nice dress would receive. It looks, at least to the court[,] that you have
no interest in being there and that is looked at as disrespect to the court . . . .
For Men
 A dark suit is preferred. If a suit is not available, then slacks and a white shirt and tie
at the minimum!
 Dress shoes (NEVER WEAR SNEAKERS IN A COURTROOM, PERIOD)
 Hair well groomed and neat. If you have long hair, make sure it is tied back and
combed back.
 Don’t bathe yourself in strong cologne. This isn’t a club and no one wants the
distracting smell of another in court.
The Charles Johnson Law Firm, In the Courtroom—Dress Code, http://www.houstonlawyer.com/
inthecourtroom.htm.
129. See Schnall et al., Disgust, supra note 74, at 1102.
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cleansing.130 A defendant may face more sympathetic treatment in the
morning right after the judge and jurors have taken showers.131 Likewise, it
may behoove a defense attorney to ask for a recess directly after a particularly
disgusting detail has emerged or prior to a moment of moral deliberation in
hopes that those making assessments may use the restroom (and wash their
hands) during the break.132 It is possible that defendants may actually fare
better in times of mass illness as a result of people washing their hands more
and official government policies focused on reducing the spread of disease
through cleanliness measures.133
In addition, the experience of one’s body may also influence moral
assessments of one’s self. This might be important in two ways. For one,
physical cleansing by a defendant may reduce the moral emotions of guilt,
shame, embarrassment, and regret.134 A defendant who has just showered or
washed his hands may feel and act less guilty.135 For another, it is plausible
that judges or jurors who have just cleaned themselves may be less motivated
to act in morally-upstanding ways because, in the words of Zhong and
Liljenquist, they have “washed away [any existing] moral stains and restored a
suitable moral self.”136 This is especially disquieting, as there are many
aspects of a trial and an appeal that depend on judges and jurors following their
charges diligently and honestly without significant oversight.
III. THE CHALLENGE OF APPLICATION
The preceding section offered a number of ways in which experiences of
the body within the courtroom might have an impact on outcomes for those
who come before our courts. This raises the question of whether we can—or
should—make changes to our systems of justice in response, either now or
once the research investigated in this Article has further developed.

130. See Schnall et al., Clean Conscience, supra note 71, at 1222.
131. See id. at 1220 (discussing how cognitive priming of cleanliness led to less harsh moral
judgments).
132. Id. at 1221.
133. See id. at 1219 (hypothesizing that cleansing behavior may soften moral judgments of
third persons). Prompted by the 2009 H1N1 virus outbreak, the Indiana Courts developed a guide
and checklist for trial courts handling a pandemic, which included improving hand hygiene (e.g.,
encouraging court employees to wash their hands with soap and water and “[p]lac[ing] alcoholbased hand sanitizer at high traffic locations such as break rooms, conference rooms, etc.” and
“[f]requently clean[ing] all commonly touched surfaces in the workplace, such as workstations,
countertops, and doorknobs.” Indiana Courts’ Pandemic Preparation Guide & Checklist 4 (Oct.
9, 2009), available at http://www.in.gov/flu/files/Indiana_Courts_Pandemic_Preparation_Guide_
and_Checklist.pdf.
134. See Zhong & Liljenquist, supra note 77, at 1452.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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In certain ways, embodied cognition research presents a heartier challenge
than other insights from the mind sciences introduced in the last few decades,
both because it conflicts with our deep-seated intuitions about the relationship
between the mind and body, and because it is greatly unsettling to our existing
legal structures, potentially undermining the notion of fair and equal justice.
A.

An Inextricable Tangle

Reading an article like this feels a bit like taking a peak into Pandora’s
box—or, more aptly, opening a can of worms. It is not quite clear what truly
lies inside, but a first glimpse suggests that unpleasant surprises may be in
store: an inextricable tangle, a squirming mess let loose. If our bodily
experiences of temperature, weight, and cleanliness matter to our justice
system, what else? There are hundreds of other potentially important
variables. Our experiences with size, position, color, hardness, brightness,
dryness, and texture could all be tipping the scales of justice one way or
another. The pitch of the chair a juror sits in might influence her judgment, as
might the material of her slacks, or the height of the ceiling in the deliberation
room, or whether there are any windows, or whether it is a sunny or a cloudy
day, or whether she has a sore throat or has just eaten a crusty sandwich. It
might matter that the prosecutor was very tall rather than very short. It might
matter that witnesses were seated in the left field of vision of jurors rather than
the right. Can we actually be expected to act on any of these factors? And
what would “acting” ultimately entail? Mandating consistency in courtroom
architecture and temperature? Informing jurors of the potential impact of
bodily factors, or training judges to be cognizant of biasing influences?
Testing the sensorimotor sensitivities of potential jurors, judges, and law clerks
to see which individuals are particularly sensitive to haptic and other cues?137
Moving to all electronic documents in the courthouse? Issuing uniformly
designed court clothing? Conducting trials in virtual worlds with carefully
constructed avatars standing in for the lead courtroom players? Many of these
possibilities imply radical departures from our current structures and processes,
and seem to defy easy implementation.138 What is the proper amount of
cleanliness for a juror to exercise “fair” judgment? What is the optimal
temperature for making an accurate assessment of the trustworthiness of a

137. See, e.g., Krishna & Morrin, supra note 99, at 807 (noting that individuals vary in their
“autotelic need for touch (general liking for haptic input)” and are consequently affected
differently by haptic cues); Schnall et al., Disgust, supra note 74, at 1105 (noting that individuals
vary in sensitivity to bodily sensations related to disgust).
138. In this sense, incorporating the insights of embodied cognition into workable changes to
court or police department procedures and processes seems considerably more difficult than the
ongoing process of improving eyewitness identification procedures discussed earlier. See supra
notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
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witness? And how would we know if, by enacting such reforms, we were not
making things worse or creating other yet-to-be-identified situational cues?
Taking into account all of this complexity, is it not more prudent to just assume
that it is a wash—that if there is one dynamic biasing in one direction, there is
probably another biasing in the other? Is it not best to assume that plaintiffs
and defendants come out roughly equally when it comes to the impact of
embodied cognition on courtroom participants?
B.

A Threat to the Legitimacy of the Law

Indeed, it is worth considering whether just discussing or writing about
embodied cognition without advocating any radical changes to our legal
system might be very dangerous in and of itself. The viability of the law is
dependent on both the establishment of a moral consensus behind legal rules
and the creation and maintenance of the legitimacy of legal authorities.139
“[A]lthough the threat of punishment is always in the background when
dealing with legal authorities, most people accept the decisions of those
authorities not because they fear them, but because they view their actions as
legitimate.”140 And, in fact, some studies show that when individuals believe
that the authorities are legitimate they are significantly more willing to defer to
those people or institutions.141 Moreover, research suggests that perceived
legitimacy is tied to whether individuals believe that the authorities used fair
procedures in reaching verdicts and sentences:142 “[T]he reputation of the
criminal justice system for fair and respectful treatment of people is central to
its ability to enlist voluntary compliance from citizens with the law . . . .”143 In
one study, for example, Tom Tyler and Yuen Huo found that Chicago
residents’ skepticism of the courts and overall reluctance to obey the law “were
strongly influenced by whether they believed that the police and the courts
139. See John Darley et al., Psychological Jurisprudence: Taking Psychology and Law into
the Twenty-First Century, in 14 PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY, TAKING
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 37, 51 (James R.P. Ogloff ed.,
2002). Indeed, John Darley and his colleagues have argued that “[l]egitimacy provides greater
and more reliable authority to legal officials than does morality, since they have discretionary
authority to decide what is appropriate. Within the scope of their prescribed roles, the police and
courts make decisions and citizens believe that they ought to obey those decisions.” Id.
140. Id. at 43 (“Studies of Americans find that people’s feelings of obligation to obey the
police and the courts are generally quite high, even in the face of widespread expressions of
dissatisfaction with the law and with legal authorities.”) (citations omitted).
141. See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161 (1990).
142. See Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of
Criminal Law Rules, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 993 (2003); Darley et al., supra note 139, at 55.
143. Robinson & Darley, supra note 142, at 994. The dynamic appears to manifest itself both
in the “reaction[] to personal experiences with legal authorities . . . [and] when people are
evaluating national level political and legal authorities like the Supreme Court.” Darley et al.,
supra note 139, at 52.
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treated people with respect, dignity, and fairness and did not harass them or
subject them to rude or inappropriate treatment.”144 When members of the
public believe that fairness has fallen by the wayside, they are more likely to
be outraged, lose respect for the law, and engage in (further) law-breaking
behavior.145
In view of this research, the threat of exposing the truth about embodied
cognition should be evident. This work suggests that our judicial procedures
may not be fair. Convictions, sentences, and holdings may turn on things that
we believe ought to be irrelevant to the proceedings. What the law says and
what actually happened may matter less than what the judge happens to be
drinking on the bench.146 The purported protections built into the system—
rules excluding hearsay, freedom from self-incrimination, and the right to
confront witnesses, among others—may be considerably less significant than
we imagined.
C. Meeting the Challenge
These concerns are real and we ought not gloss over them. It is true that
exposing these biases built into our system—showing that the emperor is
wearing no clothes—may lead to increased skepticism of our laws, courts, and
legal actors. But the alternative is to pretend that a system that appears to be
biasing outcomes in a patterned way is legitimate. This latter approach is
untenable.
Willful ignorance is neither feasible in practice, nor justifiable. Research
in embodied cognition is increasingly gaining attention in the popular media.147
Thus, hiding this data from the public in order to ensure continued respect for
the authority of our legal institutions is not a realistic option. Moreover, as
discussed earlier, it is almost certain that market participants, among others,
are going to pay close attention to this budding area of research in future
months and years, whether or not legal scholars and reformers elect to join
them, because the work offers the keys to increasing influence.148 For
corporate actors, understanding embodied cognition provides the opportunity
to manipulate consumers more precisely and effectively to achieve particular

144. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 181 (2002).
145. Darley et al., supra note 139, at 55.
146. See infra notes 144–47 and accompanying text (discussing legal realist insights).
147. See, e.g., Audrey Grayson, That’s Cold: How Exclusion Can Leave You Chilly: New
Research Suggests Those Who Are Socially Excluded Actually Feel Colder, ABCNEWS.COM,
Sept. 16, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/DepressionNews/story?id=5808961&page=1;
Bennett, supra note 96; Telephone Interview by Kathleen Dunn with Joshua Ackerman,
Wisconsin Public Radio, (Oct. 6, 2009), available at http://clipcast.wpr.org:8080/ramgen/wpr/
dun/dun091006e.rm.
148. See supra Part I.D.
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ends without people ever knowing that they are being manipulated. Hence, it
presents the appealing prospect of greatly expanding profits, while avoiding
the perception of “impropriety” that leads to litigation and regulation. Given
this reality, it is a dereliction of duty for the legal establishment not to act as a
counterweight to protect our citizens. Our job as lawyers and legal scholars is
to root out injustice and unfairness wherever we find it.
Although the notion that we can ignore the embodied cognition research
because everything is likely to “balance out” is strongly appealing, it is almost
certainly incorrect. Many people who appear before our courts are not repeat
players and many cannot bear a negative judgment.149 If they lose a case that
is it: there is no chance to make up the difference the next time around. And
their case may hinge on just a few key moments at trial. If a bodily prime
turns a jury against a critical witness, or occurs while the jury is meeting for an
hour to deliberate, there may be no other opportunity to offset the bodily prime
and equilibrate the proceedings. It might be some reassurance to think that at
least it is all just a matter of chance (whether jurors are drinking hot coffee or
cold soda as they conference; whether hands are washed before or after gory
testimony), but it is not at all clear that any of the primes discussed in this
Article occur randomly. It is altogether possible—likely, even—that certain
factors are largely constant and act as an unseen current subtly steering juries
and judges to the same shore time and time again.
We must be cautious, and we should not act on mere speculations about
potentially biasing factors. But as the research on embodied cognition
continues, and as findings are replicated and elaborated, it is our duty to act,
even if imposing obstacles loom on the horizon, and even if the journey proves
long and arduous. We are strong enough—and the law is strong enough—to
carry the weight.
CONCLUSION
It was a pivotal moment in Western history and philosophy, but Descartes
was wrong when he confidently concluded, “I [am] . . . entirely and absolutely
distinct from my body.”150 Research in the mind sciences, particularly in the
area of embodied cognition, has provided compelling evidence that minds and
bodies are not so easily separated. Yet the idea of disembodied reason has
had—and continues to have—a powerful influence on our culture, institutions,
and systems.
The popular ideal of the judge is, in many ways, the disembodied
adjudicator, the legal mind floating in space: independent, unbiased, rational,
149. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in
Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 931 (2008) (noting that this is “a
country where most citizens’ experience with the court system is as one-shot players”).
150. DESCARTES, supra note 1, at 112.
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apart from the world. So, too, the common image of the law: pristine,
objective, immaculate, clear and certain, separate and pure, uncorrupted and
un-co-opted.
In truth, these images have never been accurate. The Legal Realists knew
that almost a century ago when they suggested that the law was embedded in
(and the product of) societal realities and that judges were real people with real
biases.151 A judge’s decision might not just reflect what the law said, but also
broader public forces, cultural dynamics, and the judge’s “political, economic,
Human psychological
and professional background and activities.”152
proclivities might drive case determinations.153 Hence, the psycho-social
impulse of Realism became associated with the idea that a case might turn on
things that seemed, and were held to be, irrelevant to the law—factors as
immaterial as “what the judge ate for breakfast.”154
To a significant extent, bringing embodied cognition research to the legal
arena is about continuing the Realist project. This research suggests that it is
not just what the judge ate for breakfast: it is also what the judge is sitting on,
wearing, smelling, and holding in his hand. All of these elements and more
may be consequential. There is much still left to investigate, and we must keep
our feet moving, marching out of the Enlightenment and into the light.

151. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 52–53 Martin P. Golding & William A.
Edmundson, eds., 2005.
152. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV 809, 846 (1935). In the words of Herman Oliphant, courts “respond to the stimulus of the
facts in the concrete cases before them rather than to the stimulus of over-general and outworn
abstractions in opinions and treatises.” Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J.
71, 75 (1928).
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